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INTRODUCTION

American legal history is replete with challenges to the soundness and application of statutes providing for the imposition of the
death penalty. Although many challenges are based on the contention that the particular method of punishment is violative of eighth
amendment guarantees,I the Supreme Court has dealt only recently
with the more troublesome claim that capital punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment per se. 2 For example, in
Furman v. Georgia3 the Court struck down two capital punishment
statutes, holding that the potential for discriminatory imposition of
the death penalty rendered them violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Many assumed prematurely that Furmansigt Paper presented to the Southern Sociological Society, section on Deviance and Social
Control, Atlanta, Georgia, April 1, 1977.
*Associate Professor of Sociology, Bowling Green State University. B.S., McMurry College, 1966; M.A., 1969, Ph.D., 1971, University of Kentucky.
1. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436
(1889); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
2. The number of opportunities that the Supreme Court has had to confront directly
the issue whether capital punishment is unconstitutional per se is difficult to determine. The
issue was avoided effectively until Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), but even in that
case only Justices Brennan and Marshall addressed the argument that capital punishment
is a violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments in and of itself. Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and White concurred with the conclusions of Justices Brennan and Marshall, but
they carefully avoided suggesting that the death penalty could not be imposed under any
circumstances by focusing upon the manner in which the statutes under consideration were
applied, rather than upon the broader concerns addressed by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
3. Id.
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naled the abolition of capital punishment, but subsequent opinions
in Gregg v. Georgia,4 Profitt v. Florida,5 and Jurek v. Texas' upheld
the constitutionality of post-Furman death penalty statutes, making clear the Court's unwillingness to view capital punishment as
an inherent affront to eighth amendment protections.
In the aftermath of Gregg and a controversial execution in
Utah, the future of capital punishment in the United States is uncertain. The confusion is in part a product of a lack of clarity in the
opinions of individual Supreme Court members and the aversion of
some of the Justices to assuming or limiting legislative prerogatives. 7 Furthermore, the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of the death penalty will not turn necessarily on its compatibility with contemporary understandings of the eighth amendment.'
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, no one would question the contention that challenges to particular statutes will continue to flow
4. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
5. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
6. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
7. As will be further detailed in subsequent sections of this analysis, the strain between
attempting to guarantee fundamental rights and avoiding any improper intrusion on the
presumed powers of the legislative and executive branches remains considerable. Capital
punishment cases often bring this strain into particularly sharp relief, frequently in a very
personal manner. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Furman,provided an eloquent illustration
when he observed:
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit. I yield to no
one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death
penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised
by finite minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves
no useful purpose that can be demonstrated. . . . It is antagonistic to any sense of
"reverence for life."
Were I a legislator, I would do all I could to sponsor and vote for legislation abolishing the death penalty. And were I the chief executive of a sovereign State, I would be
sorely tempted to exercise executive clemency ....
[But these powers] should not be
taken over by the judiciary in the modern guise of an Eighth Amendment issue.
Id. at 405-06, 410 (emphasis added).
8. Although Furman and Gregg have stimulated interest in eighth amendment challenges, and while the protection against cruel and unusual punishment formed the basis of
early capital punishment cases, see note 1 supra, other contemporary cases have taken radically different approaches. For example, in Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the Court
rejected the contention that the absence of a bifurcated trial procedure was unsound; but see
note 32 infra and accompanying text; in McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), the
Court rejected the related argument that the standardless discretion permitted juries in
capital cases violated due process rights; but see note 32 infra and accompanying text; in
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court reversed the lower court decision
because of the improper method of jury selection that resulted in the systematic exclusion of
veniremen "who shall, on being examined, state that [they have] conscientious scruples
against capital punishment, or that [they are] opposed to the same." Id. at 512.
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from the deceptively simple premise, grounded on the landmark
decisions in Weems v. United States' and Trop v. Dulles, 0 that any
death penalty statute, however carefully constructed and applied,
violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
In light of the Court's recent holding in Gregg v. Georgia, future
death penalty challenges almost certainly will focus upon the type
and quality of evidence available to serve as "objective indicia that
reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction."' " Unfortunately, the "objective indicia" that can be relied upon and the manner in which they are to be weighted is not altogether clear. In
Gregg, for example, the Court emphasized such traditional considerations as legislative enactments, decisions rendered by juries, and
the single post-Furman referendum on the death penalty.'" Addi-'
tionally, evidence pertaining to the determinants of public support
for capital punishment, as opposed to simpler assessments of the
amount of support existing at any point in time, also was viewed as
relevant.' 3
9. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In Weems the Court found that a 15 year jail term imposed upon
a public official convicted of falsifying public documents was a cruel and unusual punishment. In reaching his decision, Justice McKenna reviewed punishments imposed for other
crimes and determined that the severity of the sentence under attack was not justified by
the crime that had been committed. As the court stated,
[T]his contrast shows more than different exercises of legislative judgment. It is greater
than that. It condemns the sentence in this case as cruel and unusual. It exhibits a
difference between unrestrained power and that which is exercised under the spirit of
constitutional limitations formed to establish justice. The State thereby suffers nothing
and loses no power. The purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just, not tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for
the reformation of the criminal.
Id. at 381.
10. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). In Trop petitioner sought reversal of his expatriation imposed
following his conviction by court-martial for wartime desertion. Finding that the existence
of the death penalty as a potential sanction for wartime desertion did not automatically
warrant the imposition of any lesser penalty, the Court determined that expatriation violated
the safeguards imposed by the eighth amendment. In so holding, the Court stated that:
While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this
power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards. Fines, imprisonment and
even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but any
technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect.
Id. at 100.
11. 428 U.S. at 173.
12. Id. at 179-83.
13. For example, Justice Stewart observed in the plurality opinion in Gregg that:
Considerations of federalism, as well as respect for the ability of a legislature to evaluate,
in terms of its particular state the moral consensus concerning the death penalty and
its social utility as a sanction, require us to conclude, in the absense of more convincing
evidence, that the infliction of death as a punishment for murder is not without justification and thus is not unconstitutionally severe.
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The willingness of those concerned with eighth amendment
capital punishment challenges to consider behavioral scientific research on determinants of public support for the death penalty provides the stimulus for the analysis presented in this Article. The
thesis to be advanced may be summarized simply: there is ample
reason to believe that public support for capital punishment is associated with two pervasive beliefs. The first is a belief that some
kinds of behavior are sufficiently offensive to fundamental moral
standards that death is an appropriate punishment, regardless of
whether it serves any other end. Although philosophers make finer
distinctions, this justification for capital punishment essentially is
retributive. The second justification, which places less emphasis on
whether a sanction is just or unjust in some abstract sense, reflects
a belief that the death penalty serves to deter potential offenders
from engaging in criminal behavior. This perspective on punishment can be viewed as utilitarian.
Although the question has never been posed directly, 4 prior
research suggests that the utilitarian and retributive perspectives
might be linked to one another. In other words, those who subscribe
to utilitarian beliefs regarding punishment also are prone to hold
retributive sentiments."5 If this premise is tenable, properly conducted research should yield two sets of relationships. First, those
who are either most retributive or most utilitarian in their attitudes
toward punishment also should be supportive of capital punishment. Second, those who hold both strongly retributive and strongly
utilitarian attitudes should be more likely to support the death
penalty. To the extent that there is objective, empirical support for
these implications, serious questions arise concerning the constitutionality of capital punishment under the current standards for
evaluating eighth amendment challenges. Although the Supreme
Id. at 186-87 (emphasis added). As is noted throughout the discussion, there is no clear
standard by which the Court presently evaluates exactly what evidence it might view as
convincing. Nevertheless, for reasons detailed more thoroughly in the text of this analysis,
there is substantial reason to believe that measures of public opinion and the foundations
for that opinion are of direct relevance.
14. The general issue, however, has been dealt with elsewhere. See, e.g., C. THOMAS &
A. MASON, CORRELATES OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1978); Sarat & Vidmar,
Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment, 976 Wis. L. REV. 171;
Thomas, A Sociological Perspective on Public Support for Capital Punishment, 45 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 641 (1975); Thomas & Howard, Public Attitudes Toward Capital
Punishment,J. BEHAVIORAL EcON. (Summer 1977).
15. See, e.g., Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 14; Thomas, Perceptions of Crime, Punishment, and Legal Sanctions (1976) (unpublished paper presented to American Society of Criminology, Tuscon, Arizona).
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Court has recognized that retribution is a legitimate rationale for
punishment, 6 it also has held that retribution is neither a sufficient
nor a dominant justification. 7 Similarly, while deterrence is both an
obvious and a proper goal of any legal sanction, the deterrent effect
of capital punishment upon homicide, the only offense the Court
has viewed or appears likely to view as deserving of a death sentence, 18 remains undetermined. The preponderance of the evidence
reveals no deterrent impact whatsoever, and none of the evidence
indicates any effect that could not be obtained by a less severe
sanction."8 Thus, even if one assumes that private citizens are familiar with this very technical body of research, he would have to
conclude that their sentiments are neither consistent with the findings of that literature nor a product of fully or even adequately
informed opinion.
The analysis to be presented in this Article focuses upon data
obtained from a randomly selected sample of the heads of more than
three thousand households in a Virginia metropolitan area. The goal
of that analysis is to determine the extent to which retributive and
utilitarian sentiments are interrelated and, more important, to evaluate the role these sentiments play in determining support for capital punishment. Before presenting this analysis, however, an overview of the issues this kind of research raises will be presented in
order to highlight distinct differences in the Supreme Court's past
interpretations of the role of the eighth amendment.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

Challenges to the death penalty that are based upon the contention that capital punishment is unconstitutional per se are of
16. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183.
17. The impact of previous cases may reasonably be interpreted in this manner. The
implication is stated clearly, for example, in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949):
"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."
18. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
19. Baldus & Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich on
the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Bowers & Pierce, The
Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich'sResearch on Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187
(1975); Schuessler, The DeterrentEffect of the Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952). Contra,
Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM.
EcoN. REv. 397 (1975). Although the notion that the death penalty may serve both the goals
of retribution and deterrence runs through Gregg and other contemporary cases, the Court
has not gone so far as to hold that an obligation exists to employ less severe punishments
when they would be equally effective. Thus, as the Court stated in Gregg, "We may not
require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected
is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved." 428 U.S. at 175.
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recent vintage. The issue was posed in Furman, however, and although the Court did not treat the issue definitively, two very different perspectives were brought into sharp relief. These perspectives
have been referred to elsewhere as the "analytic" and the
"normative" views of the eighth amendment."0 Although these views
are not at odds with each other on every point, they vary sufficiently
to warrant separate treatment.
The first viewpoint, which the Supreme Court finds more attractive, "interprets the eighth amendment by finding its meaning
in other provisions of the Constitution and seems to deprive that
Amendment of any 'independent potency.'"21 This approach
formed the basis for the opinions of Justices Douglas, Stewart, and
White in Furman v. Georgia,22 and led Justice Douglas to observe
that "these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is
an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the
laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments." 3 Thus, in striking down the particular statutes under review, these Justices interpreted the eighth amendment by looking
to due process and equal protection considerations.
The alternative perspective attributes a far more independent
status to the eighth amendment. This normative method, which
takes Weems v. United States and Trop v. Dulles 5 as its primary
20. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 14.
21. Id. at 173.
22. 408 U.S. at 240-57, 306-10, 310-14.
23. Id. at 256-57.
24. Weems contains particularly clear language regarding the need for avoiding a static
interpretation of constitutional protections. In that case, Justice McKenna noted that:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a

principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave
it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions ....

In the application of a constitution,

therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. Under
any other rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be
deficient in efficacy and power. Its general principles would have little value and be
converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words
might be lost in reality.
217 U.S. at 373.

25.

Trop provides a similarly clear statement of the position advanced in Weems. Chief

Justice Warren argued that:

The provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn adages or hollow shibboleths.
They are vital, living principles that authorize and limit governmental powers in our
Nation. They are the rules of government. When the constitutionality of an Act of
Congress is challenged in this Court, we must apply those rules. If we do not, the words
of the Constitution become little more than good advice.
356 U.S. at 103-04. (emphasis added).
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antecedents, considers whether a punishment is offensive to contemporary public sentiments and standards of decency. For example, Justice Brennan, concurring in Furman,stated, "A third principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be
unacceptable to contemporary society. Rejection by society, of
course, is a strong indication that a severe punishment does not
comport with human dignity."" Justice Brennan further noted that,
"Indeed, the likelihood is great that [the statutory availability of]
the punishment is tolerated only because of its disuse. The objective
indicator of society's view of an unusually severe punishment is
what society does with it, and today society will inflict death upon
only a small sample of the eligible criminals." Similarly, Justice
Marshall argued in his concurring opinion that "where a punishment is not excessive and serves a valid legislative purpose, it still
There are no
may be invalid if popular sentiment abhors it ....
prior cases in this Court striking down a penalty on this ground, but
the very notion of changing values requires that we recognize its
existence." 2 On this basis he later concludes that "even if capital
punishment is not excessive, it nonetheless violates the Eighth
Amendment because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the
United States at this time in their history. ' 2 Unlike the other members of the majority, Justices Brennan and Marshall attached independent significance to eighth amendment guarantees and concluded that a punishment that is "cruel and unusual" in the eyes
of society should be deemed unconstitutional.
In short, clear differences arise in the standards and kinds of
evidence that are likely to play a determinative role when one compares opinions representative of the analytic and normative positions on the eighth amendment." To the extent that the analytic
method, which is reflected in the concurring opinions of no less than
three members of the Furman Court, relies heavily on notions of
equal protection and due process in attributing meaning to the
eighth amendment, any constitutional infirmities in death penalty
statutes can be remedied by legislation. Indeed, by the time Gregg
was decided in July 1976, at least thirty-five state legislatures and
26. 408 U.S. at 277.
27. Id. at 300.
28. Id. at 332.
29. Id. at 360.
30. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 14; White, The Role of the Social Sciences in Determining the Constitutionalityof Capital Punishment, 13 DuQ. L. Rav. 279 (1974).
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Congress had responded to Furmanwith revised death penalty statutes. Although many of these newly-enacted statutes will be challenged, the current Supreme Court likely will rule favorably on the
constitutionality of nonmandatory' capital punishment for some
degrees of homicides if the statutes, at a minimum, provide for (1)
a bifurcated trial on the issues of guilt and punishment; (2) a precise
statutory specification of aggravating circumstances; (3) the admission during the determination of the appropriate sentence of far less
precise information on possible mitigating circumstances; and (4)
an automatic review of all death sentences.12
In contrast, proponents of the normative position will not be
influenced by procedural adjustments. Justice Brennan, dissenting
in Gregg, argued that:
This Court inescapably has the duty, as the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of our Constitution, to say whether, when individuals condemned to death
stand before our Bar, "moral concepts" require us to hold that the law has
progressed to the point where we should declare that the punishment of death,
like punishments on the rack, the screw, and the wheel, is no longer morally
tolerable in our civilized society.
I would set aside the death sentences imposed.
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.Y

. .

as violative of the

Consequently, those whose opposition to capital punishment is
based on a normative analysis will not be satisfied by legislative
adjustments designed to meet the objections of the Furmanplurality.
Recent capital punishment decisions present a dilemma to sociologists of law who have examined the issues posed by the analytic
and normative interpretations of the role of the eighth amendment.
The issues presented by decisions such as Furman and Gregg provide ample support for the belief that scientific behavioral research
has a direct bearing on many of the questions placed before the
Supreme Court. For example, the determination whether capital
punishment serves a legitimate state interest through deterring potential offenders is a question properly resolved through empirical
31. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325 (1976), for recent discussions of the status of mandatory statutes.
32. Although one or more of these requirements are contrary to some relatively recent
decisions of the Supreme Court, each seems consistent with the views expressed in Gregg.
See, e.g., McGautha v. California and Crampton v. Ohio. For a more thorough discussion of
the standards now employed by the Court, see Davis, ConstitutionalIssues Involved in PostGregg CapitalLitigation (1976)(unpublished address at the NLADA Convention).
33. 428 U.S. at 229, 231.
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research rather than through traditional legal scholarship. Similarly, the issue whether the "dynamic" character of the eighth
amendment described in Weems and Trop supports challenges to
the death penalty because that sanction constitutes an affront to
contemporary standards of morality also requires empirical data
rather than legal precedent. The opinions delivered by the Supreme
Court provide very few guidelines for measuring public sentiment
toward capital punishment, however, and those the Court does present are ambiguous. Two responses to this dilemma are possible.
The obvious response is to deal separately with the analytic and
normative perspectives. Through this framework, one line of empirical research might address the manner in which capital punishment statutes are applied. In this vein, the Furmanholding, as interpreted in Gregg, is particularly relevant: "In order to minimize
the risk that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously
selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be
guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus
on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant." This approach directs attention to the actual operation of
the criminal justice system, rather than to the apparent intent or
structure of legislative enactments or judicially imposed procedural
constraints. The opinions in Furmanand Gregg clearly suggest that
any law having the effect in actual practice of depriving defendants
of their right to due process and equal protection through the arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory imposition of the death sentence
violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments.3 5
A second line of research would consider various facets of
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."3 6 Rather than focusing upon procedural matters, this line
of analysis assesses public sentiment toward the death penalty and,
following the so-called "Marshall Hypothesis,"3 draws a distinction
between public preferences and informed public opinion." Hard
empirical evidence on actual effects might be determinative to those
adopting the analytic position on the eighth amendment, while data
34. Id. at 199.
35. For example, in Gregg Justice Stewart argued that, "Because of the uniqueness of
the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed under sentencing procedures
that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner." Id. at 188.
36. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101.
37. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 14, at 194-96.
38. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 314, 371; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 232,
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concerning public opinion would be no less important to those advocating the normative position.
Although devoting separate attention to the analytic and normative positions on the eighth amendment has obvious advantages,
two potentially damaging flaws emerge. First, discrete analysis
might result in research that has little influence on the opinion of
the majority of the Court because it focuses narrowly on the special
concerns of particular Justices. A recent and important study reported by Sarat and Vidmar, 5 for example, provides a rather sophisticated empirical test of the position advanced by Justice Marshall
4 0 This study
in Furman.
considered not only whether the subjects
of the sample supported capital punishment, but went beyond that
general assessment to evaluate the extent to which such opinions
were based on objective information and the effect of exposure to
additional information about capital punishment on those opinions. 4 ' The study was cited by Justice Marshall in his dissenting
opinion in Gregg,42 but the other members of the Court did not
consider crucial Justice Marshall's contention that fully informed
citizens would share his feeling that the death penalty is inherently
violative of the eighth amendment. Thus, the Sarat and Vidmar
study, while contributing to scholarly research in this area, apparently was framed in such a way that it appealed only to the concerns
of Justice Marshall and, perhaps, Justice Brennan.
A second, more general problem with a separate focus is its
implication that no common thread runs through the opinions of a
majority of the Court. While this may be true, a review of Furman,
Gregg, and their respective companion cases suggests a possible
common denominator. In the course of reaching contrary conclusions in Gregg, those Justices employing either the analytic or normative views examined essentially similar evidence, with particular
emphasis on the relevance of public sentiment. The former group
found that Florida, Georgia, and Texas had remedied the defects
39. Sarat & Vidmar, supra note 14.
40. 408 U.S. at 314-16.
41. The "Marshall Hypothesis" posits that if citizens were fully informed about the
application and utility of the death penalty they would not support it. Thus, after determining levels of support among those in their sample, Sarat and Vidmar exposed them to various
kinds of information about capital punishment. Although the results of their analysis are too
complex to outline fully, the study does show that attitudes toward the death penalty are
influenced, among other considerations, by information regarding the utility of that punishment. This, in turn, provides a basis for Justice Marshall's contention that support for the
death penalty would be far less pronounced if the public fully understood its effects.
42. 428 U.S. at 232.
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found objectionable in Furman, while the latter held to the view
that "the American people, fully informed as to the purposes of the
death penalty and its liabilities, would . . . reject it as morally
unacceptable."" The consideration contributing most heavily to the
division of the Court is the majority's unwillingness to contradict
the trend of post-Furman legislative enactments and the apparent
willingness of juries to support the death penalty on the basis of the
available evidence. This hesistancy is expressed clearly in the plurality opinion in Gregg:
A decision that a given punishment is impermissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short of a constitutional amendment. The ability of
the people to express their preference through the normal democratic processes, as well as through ballot referenda, is shut off. Revisions cannot be
made in the light of further experience."

Those adhering to the normative view, on the other hand, arrive at
a contrary conclusion: "[T]he punishment of death, for whatever
crime and under all circumstances, is 'cruel and unusual' in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution."45 In so holding, this group does not ignore the relevance of
traditional evidence of public opinion such as legislative enactments. Rather, this group attributes its findings both to the continuing strain between the eighth amendment and legislative decisions of the sort emphasized in Trop v. Dulles" and to the greater
weight it is willing to assign to less traditional measures of public
opinion such as contemporary empirical research.
Consequently, a majority of the Court, all of whom personally
are opposed to capital punishment," shares the conviction that supportive public opinion is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition
for holding the death penalty constitutionally sound. A plurality
finds no compelling evidence for challenging the prerogatives of
legislative bodies or the outcomes of other "democratic processes."
In the absence of such evidence and in light of the statutory and
procedural remedies enacted following Furman, the plurality apparently feels bound to uphold the constitutionality of limited impositions of capital punishment. This reluctance, however, does not
43. Id.
44. Id. at 176.
45. Id. at 229.
46. See, e.g., the remarks by Chief Justice Warren quoted in note 24 supra.
47. The personal sentiments of the individual Justices were most clearly revealed in
Furman because each Justice prepared a separate opinion discussing his views of the case
and the larger issues. See note 7 supra.
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establish that the Court would find unpersuasive an accumulation
of new evidence regarding public sentiment.
The data presented in this Article is relevant to the extent that
this assessment of the underlying logic of the Gregg decision is valid.
Moreover, if support for capital punishment is found to be the product of either an unreasonable perception of its efficacy or an undue
emphasis on retribution, and if those with a more realistic assessment of the deterrent impact and those with less retributive motives
are found to be unwilling to support so extreme a penalty, then the
conclusion that capital punishment violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments must be addressed. Whether these considerations do provide the basis of current public support for capital punishment is an empirical question. The important issues cannot be
resolved through speculation, examination of legislative enactments, or evaluation of public opinion poll data that focus narrowly
on the relatively simple determination of the proportion of the public that favors some kind of death penalty. The balance of this
Article is devoted to presenting the results of survey research conducted after the Furman decision, but in advance of Gregg, that
sought to identify the determinants of public support for capital
punishment.
III.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The data presented in this Article were obtained during the
winter of 1973-1974 as part of a larger survey research project conducted in the Norfolk, Virginia, Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area. The heads of the households in the four cities comprising the
bulk of the metropolitan area (Chesapeake, Portsmouth, Norfolk,
and Virginia Beach, Virginia) were the "targets" of a systematic
random sample drawn from the current telephone directory. As
often occurs in research of this variety, many of those in the sample
no longer resided at the listed addresses, but 7,229 households were
contacted.4 8 Properly completed questionnaires were returned by
3,334 citizens, 46.12 percent of those contacted. This rate of return
is well within the acceptable range for surveys of this type, but the
48. Every reasonable effort was made to maximize the return rate in the survey. Each
respondent received a contact letter in which the goals of the study were outlined briefly and
the cooperation of each potential respondent was encouraged. Shortly thereafter, each received both a blank questionnaire and a business return envelope. If the questionnaire was
not returned promptly, each respondent received a reminder letter. If there was still no
response, a fourth mailing, which included another questionnaire and a business return
envelope, was sent.
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unavoidable problems that accompany mail surveys must be considered in interpreting the results of this analysis. Furthermore, the
social and demographic characteristics of this sample indicate that
those residents who were older, white, better-educated, and more
affluent more frequently completed and returned questionnaires
than did other individuals. This must be viewed as a systematic
bias. This sampling distortion may have some advantages, however,
because it over-represents those whose attitudes and values are of
special relevance to the issues posed herein. The over-represented
groups in this sample, for example, also are likely to be more politically active, to have more influence on legislative decisions, to occupy relatively influential positions in their communities, and to
serve on juries.
A brief examination of the manner in which the major variables
were measured is provided below:
Retributive Sentiments. Supreme Court opinions often do not
reflect a satisfactory understanding of alternative justifications for
punishment, and their perspective on retribution typically is the
most glaring illustration of the problem. For example, both Furman
and Gregg defined retribution as a constitutionally sound purpose
for punishment, but based this determination on reasons having
little relation to that purpose. The most obvious misconception is
the apparent belief that "vigilante justice" and "lynch law" will
emerge unless the "instinct for retribution" plays a role in the criminal justice system.49 This argument comes very close to equating
retribution with vengeance and has the "forward looking" character
of the utilitarian perspective. It justifies the imposition of sanctions,
not because they are just, but because their imposition has the
desired effect of lessening the likelihood that citizens dissatisfied
with legal methods will seek extra-legal methods of punishing offenders." Defined in this fashion, retribution is really no more than
another deterrence argument; legally putting offenders to death deters private citizens from doing so illegally."
49. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 183.
50. As might be expected, not all of the members of the Court are responsive to this
view. See, e.g., Justice Marshall's dissent in Gregg. Id. at 237-39.
51. The preponderance of the available evidence demonstrates that the general deterrent efficacy of capital punishment is unsubstantiated. See note 19 supra and accompanying
text. Similarly, there exists no persuasive documentation that either the availability or the
imposition of capital punishment deters private citizens from exacting illegal vengeance.
"Lynch law" clearly has not become common during this century even though a progressive
abandonment of the death penalty has occurred. See also Justice Marshall's dissent in Gregg.
428 U.S. at 231-41.
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For purposes of this analysis, retributive sentiments reflect the
belief that punishment of a guilty offender is a moral imperativejustice requires that the guilty be punished. A series of attitude
scale items were designed to measure the degree to which the sample held these sentiments. To ensure that each item in the scale
measured the same underlying attitudinal dimension, the initial
pool of items was factor analyzed. Only items having a factor loading of at least .30 on the first factor of the unrotated factor matrix
warranted inclusion in the final scale.2 This method yielded a fouritem scale having a mean of 16.22 and a standard deviation of 2.26.
Higher scores on the scale thus reflect the presence of more retribu53
tive sentiments.
UtilitarianSentiments. Both prior research and common sense
suggest that individuals are willing to impose sanctions because
they believe that some useful purpose will result. No reasonable
person would argue that human behavior is unresponsive to rewards
and punishments. The issue, rather, is whether a particular punishment, the death penalty, will deter persons other than the offender
from committing the specific conduct sought to be deterred. Herein
lies the real problem, one that was handled in a most peculiar fashion in Gregg. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart contended
that, "We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers,
such as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has
little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death penalty
undoubtedly is a significant deterrent." 54 Although the preponderance of available research clearly supports the initial observation,
no study either addresses or supports the second position. Thus the
observation that the utility "of capital punishment as a deterrent
of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly
rests with the legislatures" is most ineffective. 5 If the decisions of
reasonable people turn on the available evidence, only two decisions
52. The statistical method is quite complex, but no detailed discussion is necessary in
this Article. Suffice it to say that factor analysis is one of several techniques that commonly
are employed in the construction of attitude scales, and each reflects a concern with ensuring
that the items included in an attitudinal measure reflect a single underlying variable.
53. In each of the attitude scales employed herein, respondents were asked to indicate
their agreement or disagreement with a series of attitude items by means of a five-point
continuum: strongly agree, agree, uncertain, disagree, and strongly disagree. Examples of the
items employed in the retributive sentiments scale include the following: "We have a moral
obligation to punish people who break the law;" "There are certain kinds of behavior that
are morally wrong and which must always be made illegal."
54. 428 U.S. at 185-86.
55. Id. at 186.
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seem possible: either (1) the death penalty does not deter; or (2) the
evidence does not warrant tolerating so extreme a sanction at this
time if our willingness to do so hinges on the presumption that it
deters offenders.
Public sentiment, of course, may or may not coincide with the
preponderance of available objective evidence. Thus people may
believe that the death penalty deters without regard to its actual
effect. Previous research has demonstrated the thesis that those who
believe that capital punishment does deter also will favor the death
penalty even though the evidence supporting their belief is sparse.-,
These utilitarian sentiments are measured by a six-item attitude
scale constructed in the same manner as the retribution variable.
The final scale has a mean of 22.40 and a standard deviation of
4.33.17 High scale scores reflect increasingly utilitarian sentiments.
Support for CapitalPunishment. Regardless of how retributive
or utilitarian those in the sample might be, many likely will stop
short of endorsing capital punishment. They may, for example, view
less extreme sanctions as adequately serving either or both goals.
The present concern, however, is with assessing possible links between retributive sentiments, utilitarian beliefs, and support for
capital punishment. Thus a separate measure of the sample members' support for retention and imposition of capital punishment
was constructed in the fashion employed for the other two scales.
The final scale includes five items, and the measure has a mean of
19.71 and a standard deviation of 4.90.ss High scale scores on this
measure reflect support for continued imposition of the death penalty.
IV.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Considerable care must be exercised in analyzing and interpreting this data. Previous research shows that retributive and utilitarian sentiments are unusual variables because they are pervasive
themes in our culture and, as a result, constitute beliefs common
56. See, e.g., the studies cited in notes 14 & 15 supra.
57. Examples of the items that comprise this scale include: "If judges would give longer
sentences to criminals fewer of them would break the law again;" "A firm response to those
who violate the law would soon reduce the crime rate in our society;" and "The more seriously
we punish someone for a crime the less likely he will be to break the law again."
58. The items included in this scale include: "It's a good idea to use the death penalty
once in a while just to remind people that we will not tolerate some kinds of behavior;" "I
think we should have a mandatory death penalty for some types of very serious criminal
offenses;" and "No offense is so serious that it deserves to be punished by death."
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in virtually every segment of society. 59 Stated differently, the phenomenon is not one commonly encountered only by blacks or whites,
males or females, and the less affluent or the more affluent. Consequently, neither these beliefs nor their consequences can be explained by reference to traditional sociological variables such as
ethnicity, age, sex, or socioeconomic status. Moreover, these variables are not strictly antithetical sentiments; retributive individuals
also are likely to be utilitarian." Thus the present analysis requires
three steps. The first is to examine how closely related these sentiments are among those in the sample. Attention then can be focused
on the strength of the relationship between each belief and support
for capital punishment. Finally, the most important question is
which of the two beliefs is more significantly associated with support for capital punishment when the influence of the other belief
is removed.
The third issue may be particularly difficult for those who are
unfamiliar with multivariate analysis. The purpose of the multivariate analysis is to determine how closely retributive beliefs are
linked to support for the death penalty when the influence of utilitarian beliefs is held constant, and conversely, how important utilitarian beliefs are in determining support for capital punishment
when the effect of retributive beliefs is held constant. The outcome
of this controlled analysis is of special importance in light of the
Supreme Court's decisions since Furman. Recent Court opinions
seem consistent with the notion that a desire for retribution may
play a role, but not the dominant role, in the construction of a
constitutional basis for the death penalty. If, however, retributive
sentiments are found to be closely associated with, and possibly
determined by, the belief that punishment serves as a deterrent,
then a portion of the retributive motives necessarily would be the
product of other attitudes that are inconsistent with the preponderance of the available evidence on deterrence." Furthermore, to the
extent that utilitarian sentiments play a major role, independent of
retributive motives, in determining public support for the death
penalty, support for capital punishment is partially the product of
beliefs that are inconsistent with presently available objective evidence. In other words, the above findings would lead to the conclu59.
4 INT'L J.
60.
61.

See, e.g., Thomas & Cage, Correlatesof Public Attitudes Toward Legal Sanctions,
CRIM. & PEN. 239; Thomas & Mason, supra note 14.
Thomas, supra note 15.
See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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sion that some portion of those in the sample are willing to support
capital punishment for reasons that are not based upon adequately
informed opinions.
Table 1 provides statistical information relevant to the association between retributive and utilitarian sentiments. As expected,
the two variables are rather strongly related to one another (gamma
= .417). Even a superficial inspection of the percentages presented
in the table attests to this fact. For example, 51.5 percent of those
in the sample who fall into the least utilitarian quartile of the sample are also in the least retributive group, and only 13.4 percent of
those who are least utilitarian had high scale scores on the retribution measure. Similarly, 53.4 percent of those in the most utilitarian
group also fall within the most retributive segments of the sample,
and only 13.1 percent of those in the highly utilitarian group had
low scale scores on the retribution variable. Thus there is a strong
tendency, which is statistically significant, for retributive persons
also to embrace utilitarian sentiments. The converse also is true.
Indeed, those who feel that punishment has a pronounced deterrent
effect are over four times as likely to be highly retributive than those
who feel that punishment is not a deterrent (53.4 percent versus 13.4
percent).
Table 1
The Relationship Between Retributive and Utilitarian Beliefs
Utilitarian Beliefs
Weak

> Strong

51.5
(N=385)

34.3
(N=280)

23.3
(N=222)

13.1
(N=107)

21.4

29.8

(N-160)
13.8
(N---103)

(N=243)

31.8
(N=303)

13.4
(N=109)

17.9
(N=146)

20.4
(N---195)

20.1
(N--164)

13.4
Strong (N=100)

18.0
(N=147)

24.5
(N=234)

53.4
(N=436)

Totals

100.0
(N=816)

100.0
(N=954)

100.0
(N=-816)

Retributive
Beliefs

100.1
(N=748)

Gamma = .417, X = 583.41, ,,--.001
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A more important issue, of course, is the influence of retributive
and utilitarian sentiments upon support for capital punishment.
This information is contained in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 reveals a
moderate association between retributive sentiments and support
for capital punishment (gamma = .340) while Table 3 shows a much
stronger relationship between utilitarian beliefs and support for the
death penalty (gamma = .520). The pattern of the relationships is
similar in both tables: as the magnitude of either retributive or
utilitarian sentiments becomes stronger, support for capital punishment also increases. In Table 2, for example, we see that only 12.2
percent of those in the least retributive category strongly support
the death penalty, but 42.7 percent of their most retributive counterparts voice strong support.
Table 2
The Relationship Between Utilitarian Beliefs and Support
for the Death Penalty
Retributive Beliefs
Weak

Strong

32.0
(N=318)

20.9
(N=170)

19.1
(N-116)

13.7
(N=126)

28.7
(N=285)

33.4
22.5
(N=272) (N=137)

13.0
(N=119)

27.2
(N=270)

31.2
iN:=254)

35.9
(N=218)

30.5
(N=280)

12.2
Strong (N=121)

14.6
(N=119)

22.5
IN=137)

42.7
(N=392)

Totals

100.1
(N=815)

100.0
(N-=608)

99.9
N=917)

We

Support for the
Death Penalty

100.1
IN=994)

Gamma =.340, X" = 400.96, ,L= .001
This trend is even more dramatically revealed in Table 3. That
data shows that only 7.8 percent of those with low utilitarian scores
strongly support capital punishment and that more than one-half
(52.6 percent) of those with high scale scores also strongly support
the death penalty.
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Table 3
The Relationship Between Retributive Beliefs and Support
for the Death Penalty
Utilitarian Beliefs
3o Strong

Weak
45.6
(N=341)

23.9
(N=195)

14.6
(N=139)

6.7
(N=55)

26.2
(N=196)
20.5
(N=153)

34.9
(N=285)
30.0
(N=245)

26.9
(N=257)
38.5
(N=367)

9.2
(N=75)
31.5
(N=257)

7.8
Strong (N=58)

11.2
(N=91)

20.0
(N=191)

52.6
(N=429)

Totals

100.0
(N=816)

100.0
(N=954)

100.0
(N=769)

Supportfor
the Death
Penalty

100.1
(N=748)

Gamma = .520,

X2

= 903.04,

a =

.001

When examined together, the tables indicate that the public is
willing to impose the death penalty because they believe that it is
morally just and that it serves a useful purpose. Apparently, perceptions of utility play a more important role than retributive sentiments. Nevertheless, because these beliefs are fairly strongly related
to one another, that conclusion would be premature without a more
carefully controlled analysis. The reason for this caution is that,
when the effect of either retributive or utilitarian beliefs is assessed
while holding the other constant, the result is separate tables similar to Table 2 or Table 3 for each of the four categories of the
controlled variable. Thus, in the case of the linkage between retributive sentiments and support for capital punishment, four
"conditional tables," one for each level of the utilitarian beliefs
scale, are constructed. The first table examines the association between retributive beliefs and support for capital punishment among
those who are least utilitarian. The fourth assesses the same basic
linkage, but this table includes only those persons with the highest
utilitarian scale scores. A "conditional" measure of association, that
is, the association between the independent and dependent variables, is computed under each condition of the variable being held
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constant. If the independent variable under consideration has an
influence on support for capital punishment independent of the
variable being held constant, then the conditional associations
should be very close to the original associations presented in Tables
2 and 3. To the extent that the conditional associations are weaker
than the original association, the original relationship must have
been a product of the relatively strong association between retributive and utilitarian beliefs. In addition, a single summary measure
of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables can be obtained after removing the potentially confounding
influence of the third variable. As with the conditional measures of
association, this single summary measure, a partial correlation, will
be roughly the same as the original correlation if the original relationship is not partly the product of the influence of the third variable. Although presentation of each of the eight conditional tables is
not feasible here,62 Table 4 provides each of the relevant conditional
and partial correlations.
An inspection of Table 4 and the several contingency tables it
summarizes provides clear support for one important conclusion.
The moderate original relationship between retributive beliefs and
support for capital punishment (gamma = .340) becomes weak
(partial gamma = .182) when the influence of utilitarian sentiments
is absent, but the strong initial linkage between utilitarian sentiments (gamma = .520) is not affected greatly when retributive beliefs are held constant (partial gamma = .470). Stated more simply,
although the independent impact of retributive beliefs on support
for capital punishment is relatively weak, the independent effect of
utilitarian beliefs is substantial. Thus apparently those in the sample subscribing to retributive beliefs about punishment are not willing to support capital punishment unless they also believe that it
serves some useful purpose-deterrence.
The separate conditional tables exemplify this result, the best
example being a comparison of Table 2 and the conditional table
relating retribution to capital punishment among those in the sample with the lowest scale scores on the utilitarian sentiments measure. Table 2 demonstrates that a majority of those who are most
retributive, 51.0 percent, are quite willing to endorse capital punishment. Among those who are least utilitarian, however, only 20.0
percent of those who are most retributive remain willing to provide
62. A complete set of the tables on which this analysis is based, however, is available
from the author upon request.
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similarly strong support for the death penalty. At the other end of
the spectrum, the association between retributive beliefs and capital punishment among those who are most utilitarian dramatically
increases: 59.2 percent of the most retributive sample members support capital punishment strongly.
The ultimate message of the relationships examined in the various tables is that retributive beliefs do correlate with a willingness
to support the death penalty, but only when these notions of just
punishment are bolstered by the complementary belief that the
imposition of the death penalty will serve what they view as a useful
purpose. Consequently, a clear majority of those who both subscribe
to retributive beliefs and endorse utilitarian sentiments also support
capital punishment, but their similarly retributive counterparts
who do not view the punishment as a significant deterrent to crime
exhibit far less support for the death penalty. The reverse, however,
is not true. Subscription to utilitarian beliefs, with or without support from retributive sentiments, apparently is sufficient to produce
support for capital punishment. Thus among the least retributive,
but most utilitarian, in the sample, 45.8 percent remain highly supportive of the death penalty. Among those who are both most retributive and most utilitarian, 59.2 percent display strong support. In
neither of these contexts does support for the death penalty among
those who strongly endorse utilitarian beliefs become strikingly different from the original relationship shown in Table 3, where 52.6
percent of those with high utilitarian scale scores also supported
capital punishment strongly.
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The question remains whether these findings are of special relevance to those who are concerned, regardless of their personal
predispositions on the topic, with the very real relationship existing
between public opinion, the eighth amendment, and the constitutionality of the death penalty. With an issue as polemical as capital
punishment, the common tendency is to select facts and to frame
positions in a manner that precludes objective consideration of contrary evidence. Moreover, both proponents and detractors often
make tautological assertions that are subject to neither confirmation nor refutation. Justice Marshall, for example, approached this
pitfall in Furman and Gregg when he stated, in effect, that no
reasonable, fully informed person would be willing to support the
death penalty and that anyone voicing support must be either un-
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reasonable or inadequately informed. Subjective assessments of
this nature are irrelevant to the analysis presented in this study.
Presently, at least a majority of the Supreme Court and many with
particular concern for the dilemma posed by the death penalty believe that existing evidence does not encourage the view that capital
punishment is, at this point in history, inherently violative of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. Although Justices Brennan and
Marshall steadfastly have rejected that conclusion, a majority of the
Court, in the absence of any systematic evidence to the contrary,
argued in Gregg that popular support for capital punishment is
manifest in post-Furman legislation, jury decisions, and other
"objective indicia that reflect the public attitude." 4 A proper analysis of the public's attitudes and the bases for them demands empirical research so that the Court may base its determinations upon
more than mere speculation.
Unfortunately, no adequately precise statement can be found
of the manner in which eighth amendment attacks on the constitutionality of the death penalty are to be evaluated. Thus, regardless
of the approach adopted in any particular piece of research, the
likelihood of error is great because researchers cannot be sure that
they are examining the correct variables. Notwithstanding this obvious problem, the results of this analysis warrant careful consideration because those who adopt either the analytic or normative view
of the eighth amendment need hard empirical evidence that explains why substantial numbers of citizens remain willing to support and impose the death penalty. If the obviously high levels of
support are based upon a reasonable, adequately informed public
opinion, those holding an analytic view would almost certainly have
no alternative to viewing at least some kinds of post-Furman and
post-Gregg statutes and procedures as justifiable. Indeed, such evidence clearly would undermine the positions of both Justice Bren63. On a purely personal level, the author is no less tempted to wonder how any logical
person superficially familiar with the existing evidence, whether drawn from legal scholarship
or empirical research, could ever reach the conclusion that the death penalty is either morally
just or likely to serve any useful purpose. More persuasive, for example, is the opinion of those
who, in their Brief for Petitioner, at 6, Aikens v. California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972), contended
that the worldwide movement away from reliance on the death penalty
marks an overwhelming repudiation of the death penalty as an atavistic barbarism. The
penalty remains on the statute books only to be-and because it is-rarely and unusually
inflicted. So inflicted, it is not a part of the regular machinery of the state for the control
of crime and punishment of criminals. It is an extreme and mindless act of savagery,
practiced upon an outcast few. This is exactly the evil against which the Eighth Amendment stands.
64. See note 11 supra.
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nan and Justice Marshall. On the other hand, if the results of the
research call into question the quality of public support and, therefore, the viability of the kinds of objective indicia relied upon in
Gregg, those holding either of the two perspectives would be compelled to reexamine the basis for their beliefs that public sentiment
does indeed provide constitutional support for the death penalty.
Although such results could lead advocates of the normative position to observe that they had been correct all along, proponents of
the analytic view necessarily would find themselves in something of
a bind.
This analysis demonstrates that a substantial proportion of a
large, randomly selected sample of the heads of households residing
in a Virginia metropolitan area support the retention of the death
penalty for some kinds of criminal offenses. Such a finding is neither
particularly surprising nor especially relevant to the issues posed in
this Article. As a variety of widely publicized public opinion polls
recently have suggested, as many as two-thirds of American citizens
remain willing to support at least the availability of capital punishment as a potential sanction.' 5 The more important function of the
analysis is to pose a series of questions regarding why so many
people support so extreme a penalty. The findings reveal that two
of the motives for punishment emphasized in Gregg provide a foundation for much of this support. Many of those sampled believe that
society has a moral obligation to punish criminal offenders, and
these retributive views correlate significantly with support for the
death penalty. Similarly, those who posit that the punishment is an
effective deterrent were even more likely to endorse capital punishment.
Other findings, whose importance is considerable, are not so
easily summarized. The positive correlation between retributive
65. A very important distinction, which far too frequently is overlooked, must be drawn
between opinions toward capital punishment and an actual willingness to support or tolerate
its imposition. This point is made very effectively in Brief for Petitioner at 20, 39, Aikens v.
California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972):
When a man such as Earnest Aikens comes before the Court claiming that the law under
which he was sentenced provides for an unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment,
the question is not: will contemporary standards of decency allow the existence of such
a general law on the books? The question is, rather: will contemporary standards of
decency allow the general application of the law's penalty in fact? ... the citizen who
deals with the poll taker-like the legislator who puts or maintains a capital statute on
the books-can have his cake and eat it too. He can afford to approve the principle of
killing because in practice the persons selected to die will be so few as to go unnoticed.
The real measure of American moral attitudes about the death penalty is reflected in
what this Nation of 200 million people does.
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and utilitarian sentiments indicates that these two perspectives,
rather than dividing the sample group into two separate categories,
actually were complementary in the minds of those who support
capital punishment. Thus those most strongly agreeing with attitude items indicating retributive beliefs also most strongly agree
with those items expressing utilitarian beliefs. This positive correlation in turn necessitates a determination of which set of beliefs has
the greater impact on support for capital punishment when the
influence of the other is held constant. The controlled analysis conducted in this study suggests that public support of capital punishment stems largely from the conviction of many citizens that this
and other kinds of punishment serve the utilitarian goal of deterrence. Conversely, those in the sample who are less confident that
deterrence is a consequence of punishment are far less supportive
of the death penalty. Thus the utilitarian justification for capital
punishment has a much stronger independent effect than does the
retributive rationale. The impact of the utilitarian variable inevitably leads to the question whether capital punishment does indeed
serve a deterrent function. Modern research on deterrence has demonstrated that the death penalty has no significant effect on the
frequency of crimes for which death may be imposed." The lack of
an actual deterrent effect leads to the conclusion that much of the
support for the death penalty is not based upon a reasonable, informed assessment of the best available contemporary evidence.
The strong support appears instead to be the consequence of an
uninformed and far too generous assessment of the deterrent effect
of the death penalty.
Obviously, neither this nor any other single piece of empirical
research should be taken as definitive proof of anything. The issues
are too complex and the state of our objective knowledge in this area
far too feeble. The findings presented in this Article, however, cannot be dismissed easily. Public support for any aspect of the criminal justice system is far more a reflection of attitudes, values, and
beliefs than of a detailed factual understanding of precisely what
those systems are, how they actually function, and what their real
consequences may be. Nevertheless, the question whether a particular punishment is sound in light of evolving interpretations of the
eighth amendment demands a determination whether the requisite
level of public support exists and, if it does, whether the reasons
66.

See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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underlying that support are generally consistent with the preponderance of available evidence. A punishment that is fundamentally
inconsistent with evolving standards of morality and public sentiment is not likely to be viewed as constitutionally sound under
current eighth amendment standards. The results of this empirical
study, however, pose a much more perplexing dilemma. Although
capital punishment has received the strong support of contemporary
standards, public approval may be grounded upon deterrence, a
rationale that is demonstrably inconsistent with all but a fraction
of existing scientific evidence. If, as contemporary research indicates, the death penalty serves no appreciable deterrent function,
then the question arises whether those members of the Court adopting either the analytic or normative approaches may justifiably base
their approval of death penalty statutes upon their readings of public opinion. The Court has not yet had the opportunity to introduce
this basic issue into its analysis of eighth amendment challenges to
capital punishment, but if public sentiment is to continue to serve
as an influential determinant in the Court's decision making, then
it inevitably must address the issues presented by this study.

